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Many scholars and economists prefer carbon taxes (the one I love) to 
cap-and-trade (the one I’m with) as a mechanism to address climate change 
concerns.  A carbon tax is arguably simpler and more transparent.  
However, the political momentum appears to be behind some form of 
 *  Copyright 2010. Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Faculty Fellow, 
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cap-and-trade system.  Not wanting to have the perfect (carbon tax) be 
the enemy of the better-than-nothing (cap-and-trade), I support cap-and-
trade legislation.  Recognizing that a federal cap-and-trade program will 
affect the tax system both directly and indirectly, this paper will consider 
how the direct and indirect tax issues should be resolved.  Direct tax issues 
include how emissions credits should be treated, the tax consequences of 
the receipt of emission allowances, and the tax consequences of the sale of 
emission allowances.  A cap-and-trade system will affect the tax system  
in two broad indirect ways: 1) it will alter the effectiveness of energy            
tax incentives contained in the tax system under current law, and                         
2) the additional costs imposed by a cap-and-trade program will fall 
disproportionately on low-income taxpayers.  The regressive impact of cap-
and-trade could be resolved in a number of ways, which may include 
changing the tax system.  The resolution of tax issues should maintain the 
environmental effectiveness of the cap-and-trade program without 
increasing the complexity of the tax system.  The ideal solution would 
mitigate climate change while improving the clarity and transparency of 
the tax system. 
This paper will begin with an introduction of climate change issues, 
including a brief history of international mitigation efforts.  The next 
section will give an overview of cap-and-trade systems and describe how 
a typical cap-and-trade system would interact with the current federal 
income tax system.  The discussion of the interaction of cap-and-trade 
with the income tax will include both direct and indirect effects.  This 
section will then compare those effects with the potential impact of a 
carbon tax.  The direct impacts of cap-and-trade on the income tax system 
occur because the “trade” part of cap-and-trade creates a new financial 
instrument that needs to be accounted for within the tax system.  A 
carbon tax would not create a new financial instrument.  Both a carbon 
tax and a cap-and-trade system could cause international trade issues that 
could affect the income tax system.  Both a carbon tax and a cap-and-
trade system, by placing an additional cost on energy-intensive products, 
could alter the effectiveness of existing energy tax incentives and place a 
disproportionate burden on low-income populations. 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR ACTION 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states “warming 
of the climate is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of 
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting 
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of snow and ice, and rising average global sea level.”1  The Pew Center 
for Global Climate Change notes “the scientific evidence is clear and 
compelling: the climate is changing due to human activities.”2  The IPCC 
found that “global increases in CO2 concentrations are due primarily to 
fossil fuel use, with land-use change providing another significant but 
smaller contribution.”3  Despite increasing scientific consensus, polls show 
Americans’ declining concern about climate change.  The Pew Center 
for Climate Change found that the proportion of Americans who “think 
that there is solid evidence that the average temperature on earth has 
been getting warmer over the last few decades” dropped to 57 percent from 
71 percent.4  ‘Climate fatigue’ has set in. 
Why do I think legislative action will happen in the future?  First, 
hope springs eternal, and second, the Gulf of Mexico has sprung a big leak, 
not of hope, but of oil.  On April 20, 2010, a British Petroleum (BP) oil 
rig, the Deepwater Horizon, exploded in the Gulf of Mexico.5  On April 
24, a remotely operated vehicle discovered that oil was leaking from the 
well.6  BP’s first estimate was that 42,000 gallons of oil per day (1,000 
barrels) were leaking from the well 50 miles offshore and a mile under 
the sea.7  On April 28, a scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) concluded that the broken well was spewing 
five times as much oil as previously estimated, over 200,000 gallons per 
 1. IPCC 4TH ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm. 
 2. CREATING A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE:  THE CASE FOR ACTION 2 (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/publications/report/case-action-creating-clean-energy-future. 
 3. IPCC 4TH ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS, supra note 2, at 37. 
 4. Richard A. Kerr, Amid Worrisome Signs of Warming, ‘Climate Fatigue’ Sets 
In, 326 SCI., 926, 928 (2009). Disclosures of e-mails between British climate scientists 
using the words “trick” and “hide” also eroded public belief in climate science. See 
Sheila Jasanoff, Testing Time for Climate Science, 328 SCI. 695, 695 (2010). However, a 
more recent survey showed that Americans still strongly believe that the earth is 
warming, and puts the blame for the reported decline in climate concern on the way the 
Pew Center framed its survey questions.  See Jon A. Krosnick, The Climate Majority, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010. The Stanford Political Psychology Research Group Survey 
found that 88 percent believed that global warming has been happening, and 75 percent 
believed that climate change is due to human activity. Id. 
 5. See Campbell Robertson, Search Continues after Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2010, at A13. 
 6. See Campbell Robertson, Oil Leaking Underwater From Well in Rig Blast, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010, at A14. 
 7. See Campbell Robertson & Leslie Kaufman, Oil Leaks Could Take Months to 
Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A11. 
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day.8  On May 13, a group of scientists examining live video of the oil 
leaks concluded that the leak was “easily four or five times greater” than 
previously estimated.9  On May 22, three scientists estimated the discharge 
from the well to be at least 40,000 barrels per day (1.7 million gallons) 
and possibly up to 100,000 barrels per day (4.2 million gallons per 
day).10  Federal officials later raised their estimate of the leak to 12,000 
to 19,000 barrels per day (500,000 to 800,000 gallons).11  After trying 
several failed procedures to stem the flow of oil, BP snipped off the damaged 
well riser with giant shears, lowered a cap, and began collecting up to 
11,000 barrels of oil per day.12  However, the operation may have made 
the flow of oil from the well much larger, and there was still no 
consensus on the amount of oil flowing into the Gulf.13  On Day 50 after 
the rig explosion, the number of oiled birds arriving at the wildlife 
rescue center in Fort Jackson, Louisiana, had quintupled.14  On June 10, 
2010, the government raised their estimate of the oil flow to 25,000 to 
30,000 barrels per day (1 million to 1.3 million gallons per day).15  The 
disaster will affect sea life and coastal regions for years to come.16  The 
fact that we are seeking oil 50 miles offshore and a mile under the sea 
itself should be cause for concern.  One commentator stated, “[w]e’ve 
entered an age in which the production of energy, particularly from fossil 
fuels, demands ever-more-expensive environmental trade-offs . . . we’ve 
entered . . . the era of ‘extreme energy.’”17  Another commentator, drawing 
an analogy with banks ‘too big to fail,’ noted, “[i]f an oil well is too far 
beneath the sea to be plugged when something goes wrong, it’s too deep 
to be drilled in the first place.”18 
 8. See Campbell Robertson, Leslie Kaufman, Henry Fountain & Liz Robbins, Size of 
Spill in Gulf of Mexico is Larger Than Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at A14. 
 9. See Justin Gillis, Size of Oil Spill Underestimated, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, 
at A1. 
 10. Ian R. MacDonald, John Amos, Timothy Crone & Steve Wereley, The Measure of 
a Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, at A17. 
 11. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Estimates Suggest Spill is Biggest in U.S. History, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A15. 
 12. See Justin Gillis and Henry Fountain, Rate of Oil Leak, Still Not Clear, Puts 
Doubt on BP, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Day 50: The Latest on the Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/06/10/us/10latest.html. 
 15. Justin Gillis and Henry Fountain, New Estimates Double Rate of Oil Flowing 
into Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at A1. 
 16. See e.g., Joseph Berger, Brian Knowlton and Henry Fountain, Dispersal of Oil 
Means Cleanup to Take Years, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/06/08/us/08spill.html. 
 17. Daniel Gross, Fracking, Oil Sands, and Deep-Water Drilling, SLATE June 6, 
2010, http://www.slate.com/toolbare.aspx?action=print&id=2255906. 
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Jean-Michel Cousteau, son of the famous ocean explorer Jacques 
Cousteau, was asked recently about his hopes for the Gulf oil disaster.  
He responded, “My hope is that this is the kick in the butt that we 
needed to change, . . . and make . . . strong decisions to create a system 
which will protect us, which will protect nature, because we depend on 
nature for our own survival and well-being.”19  After the election of 
Barack Obama, his policy advisor and future Chief of Staff Rahm 
Emmanuel famously said, “You never want a serious crisis to go to 
waste.  [A] crisis provides the opportunity for us to do things that you 
could not do before.”20  President Obama wasted little time in connecting 
the disaster in the Gulf with his clean energy agenda, endorsing the 
pending Senate climate bill,21 stating that “the challenges we face—
underscored by the immense tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico—are reason 
to redouble our efforts to reform our nation’s energy policies.”22  A few 
days later, the President reiterated, “We know that our dependence on 
foreign oil endangers our security and our economy.  And the disaster in 
the gulf only underscores that even as we pursue domestic production to 
reduce our reliance on imported oil, our long-term security depends on 
the development of alternative sources of fuel and new transportation 
technologies.”23  With unfortunate timing, however, the President had 
proposed new offshore drilling just weeks before the rig exploded.24  
The offshore drilling proposal was designed to help win political support 
for comprehensive energy and climate legislation.25  The Administration’s 
back-tracking on support for broad off-shore drilling, among other 
issues, caused the loss of some key Senate allies on energy legislation.  
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-NC), a former supporter of comprehensive 
energy reform, stated that “the problems created by the historic oil spill 
in the gulf, along with the uncertainty of immigration politics, have 
 19. Interview by Lauren Brook with Jean-Michel Cousteau, (June 8, 2010), available 
at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/jan-june10/cousteau_06-08.html. 
 20. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008, 
at A2. 
 21. The American Power Act, (111th Cong., 2d Sess. 2010) (May 12, 2010). 
 22. John M. Broder, Senate Gets a Climate and Energy Bill, Modified by a Gulf 
Spill that Still Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/ 
science/earth/13climate.html. 
 23. John M. Broder, Obama Sketches Energy Plan in Oil, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/22/science/earth/22assess.html. 
 24. John M. Broder, Obama to Open Offshore Areas to Oil Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 6651796. 
 25. Id. 
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made it extremely difficult for transformational legislation in the area of 
energy and climate to garner bipartisan support at this time.”26  However, 
even before the Gulf disaster, climate change legislation faced frenzied 
political activity.  After the American Clean Energy and Security Act27 
(ACES, a.k.a. Waxman-Markey) climate bill passed in June of last year, 
the Open Secrets Blog reported that according to data collected by the 
Center for Responsive Politics, legislators opposed to the climate bill 
received more than double the funds from energy sector lobbyists than 
those who voted for the bill.28  Others see splits in the “once-monolithic 
oil and gas industry” potentially improving the prospects for climate 
legislation.29  Reporters note that “onetime allies in the utility sector, like 
Exelon, which operates low-emission nuclear plants, and the Southern 
Company, a big consumer of coal, find themselves on opposite sides of 
the debate over renewable energy.”30  BP succeeded in stopping the flow 
from the damaged wellhead on July 15, 2010.31 A week later, Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid abandoned plans to take up comprehensive 
climate change legislation before the 2010 elections.32 The Gulf of Mexico 
appears to be recovering rapidly from the massive spill, although 
environmental concerns persist.33  This crisis appears to have become a 
wasted opportunity, and using a divide-and-conquer strategy may be 
challenging given the current political climate.  Nonetheless, climate 
change mitigation continues to be an important issue, and cap-and-
trade legislation has gotten further politically than carbon taxes. 
 26. John M. Broder, Senate Gets a Climate and Energy Bill, Modified by a Gulf 
Spill that Still Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A18, available at 2010WLNR 
9862622. 
 27. Open Congress for the 111th United States Congress, H.R. 2454—American 
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,  http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/show 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 28. Legislators Opposed to Climate Bill Get Double the Funds from Energy Sector, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/06/legislators-opposed-to-climate.html (June 29, 
2009, 13:20). 
 29. John Broder & Jad Mouawad, Energy Firms Find No Unity on Climate Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 20633313. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Clifford Krauss, With Little Fanfare, Well is Plugged with Cement, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at A13, available at 2010 WLNR 15659514. 
 32. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate 
Bill in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15, available at 2010 WLNR 14692917. 
 33. Leslie Kaufman & Shaila Dewan, Oiled Gulf May Defy Direst Predictions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at D1, available at 2010 WLNR 18202317. 
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II.  HISTORY OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
Scientists have long been aware of the issue of human-caused climate 
change.34  Large-scale action to slow climate change began in 1988 with 
the establishment of the IPCC, an independent body under the auspices 
of the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations 
Environment Program.35  In 1992, the United Nations adopted the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  In 1994, the 
UNFCCC entered into force after receiving its 50th ratification.  The 
United States is a party to the UNFCCC.  The United States did not take 
the next step—it did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which was added to 
the UNFCCC in 1997.  While the UNFCCC set out a framework, the Kyoto 
Protocol required actual emission reductions.  Under the administration 
of President George W. Bush, the United States refused to agree to the 
Kyoto Protocol, which was nonetheless adopted in 2005 after Russia 
decided to ratify.36 
The implementation of the Kyoto protocol stimulated the development 
of national and regional greenhouse gas (GHG) trading systems, most 
prominently the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU-
ETS).  The EU-ETS, a carbon cap-and-trade system, was developed to 
reduce the economic costs of meeting the European Union’s Kyoto 
target of eight percent CO2 reduction by 2012.37  The UNFCCC notes 
 34. In 1898, Svante Arrhenius, the Swedish chemist warned that CO2 emissions 
could change the world’s climate.  ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE HIGH STAKES 
BATTLE OVER THE EARTH’S THREATENED CLIMATE 176 (1997). 
 35. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The First Ten 
Years 12 (2004), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first_ten_years 
_en.pdf. 
 36. Kyoto Protocol Comes into Force, BBC NEWS Feb. 16, 2005, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/16/newsid_4930000/4930554.stm. 
 37. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
October 2003 established a scheme for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading within the 
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC.   (Council Directive 2003/87, art. 1, 
2003 (L 275) 1 (EC)), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/ 
implementation_en.htm. The 8 percent collective reduction figure applies to the 15 countries 
that were EU members in 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
UK. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME 2009 EDITION (2009) 14, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
climat/pdf/brochures/etsen.pdf. See also Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping 
with Climate Change 21 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS5095, 2009), 
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&piPK 
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the importance of carbon markets, stating that they help reduce the 
overall cost of reducing GHG emissions in three ways: 1) by enabling 
companies to purchase emission reductions at the lowest cost; 2) by 
allowing companies that are cleaner and more efficient to profit from 
their technologies and practices by selling excess allowances; and 3) by 
lowering transaction costs by making it easier for buyers and sellers of 
emission credits to connect.38 
The EU-ETS, which began trading in 2005, is the world’s largest 
carbon market.39 The EU-ETS is being implemented in three phases.40  
The first phase of the EU-ETS, which ran from January 1, 2005, to 
December 31, 2007, included approximately 10,000 large industrial plants 
in the power generation, iron and steel, glass, brick, and pottery industries, 
but excluded the transport sector.  Operators of these facilities received 
emission allowances good for a one-year period, based on a share of a 
national cap.  The assigned operator could either use the allowance or 
sell any unused portion to other covered facilities.  At least 95 percent of 
the allowances in the first phase were given to the affected operators.41  
The EU-ETS covers about 40 percent of the greenhouse gas sources for 
the EU.42 
The second phase, which began on January 1, 2008, and will run 
through December 31, 2012, features a tighter cap, reducing emissions 
allowances 6.5 percent below the 2005 level.  The participants are the 27 
member states of the EU, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.43  
Each Member of the EU must submit a National Allowance Plan (NAP) 
that lays out its allocation scheme under the ETS, including individual 
allocations to each affected unit.44  These plans must be approved by the 
=64165421&theSitePK=469372&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349_200910
26142624. 
 38. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Uniting On Climate Change: A 
guide to the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol 32 (2007), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/unitingonclimate_eng.pdf. 
 39. Nathanial Gronewold, Traders are Up and Down Over Latest Version of Climate 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES CLIMATEWIRE, May 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/05/14/ 
14climatewire-traders-are-up-and-down-over-latest-version-70468.html; see also George 
Daskalakis and Raphael N. Markellos, Are the European Carbon Markets Efficient?, 17 REV. 
FUTURES MARKETS 103 (2008) (“[t]wo years after its initiation, the EU ETS accounted 
for almost 97% of the global exchange-based carbon trading with an annual turnover in 
2006 exceeding $24.4 billion.”). 
 40. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 8. 
 41. Id. at 9. 
 42. Id. at 13. 
 43. Id. at 7.  The 27 countries in the EU are the EU-15 (see note 7) plus Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia.  Collectively, these 27 countries are known as the EU-27. 
 44. LARRY PARKER, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
(ETS): KYOTO AND BEYOND CRS-3, CRS REP. RL34150 (updated Nov. 24, 2008). 
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European Commission (EC) and must guarantee the eight-percent GHG 
reduction under Kyoto.45  After review, the EC reduced the proposed 
NAPs by an average 10.5 percent to increase the likelihood of meeting 
the Kyoto target.46  During the second phase, emissions of nitrous oxide 
from the production of nitric acid are also included.  At least 90 percent 
of the allowances in the second phase will be given to operators.47  In 
2012, emissions from civil aviation will be included. 
The third phase, which will run from January 1, 2013, to December 
31, 2020, will feature an EU-wide cap, and include additional emission 
sources.  The initial cap will be set at the mid-point emissions level of 
Phase 2, and decrease by 1.74 percent each year until 2020, resulting in a 
21 percent reduction in allowances from 2005 levels.  After 2013, the 
scheme will move towards auctioning allowances, but under certain 
circumstances the Member States may be able to grant power plants up 
to 70 percent of their allowances for free in 2013, decreasing to zero 
percent for free by 2020.48 
In the United States, the debate has been framed as cap-and-trade or 
carbon taxes.  However, in Europe, carbon taxes preceded cap-and-trade 
and continue to exist together with the EU-ETS.49  The Nordic countries 
were the first adopters of carbon taxes: Finland and Sweden in 1990, 
Norway in 1991, and Denmark in 1992.50  The Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Germany, and the UK followed with their own carbon taxes.51  Carbon 
taxes are a form of energy tax,52 and all 27 of the countries in the EU 
have some form of energy tax.53  The EC, the governing body for the 
EU, issued several directives—in 1992, 1994, 1997, and 2003—
recommending the use of energy taxation to address climate change.54  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 9. 
 48. EU-ETC 2009, supra note 38, at 17. 
 49. See Mikael Skou Andersen, Environmental and Economic Implications of Taxing 
and Trading Carbon: Some European Experiences, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 61, 80 (2008). 
 50. Andersen, supra note 50, at 63. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Carbon taxes are measured in emission units, while energy taxes are measured 
in fuel volume or energy units. 
 53. Energy, Transport and Environmental Indicators, EUROSTAT, 159 (2009), available 
at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-09-001/EN/KS-DK-09-001-
EN.PDF. 
 54. Stefan Speck, The Design of Carbon and Broad-based Energy Taxes in European 
Countries, 10 VT. J. ENVTL L. 31, 33–34 (2008). 
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The 2003 Energy Taxation Directive established a EU-wide minimum 
energy tax levels to be imposed through national law.55  Energy tax 
revenues in the EU vary between 1.6  (Belgium) and 3.9 percent (Slovenia) 
of gross domestic product.56  Between 1990 and 2005, energy related 
CO2 emissions declined in Europe by 3 percent, while increasing in the 
U.S. by 20 percent.57  Per capita emissions declined by 6.7 percent over 
the same time period in the EU, and are less than half of those in the 
U.S.58 The higher per capita emissions in the U.S. are driven by lower 
efficiency, particularly in the transport sector.59 As the EU-ETS did not 
come into operation until 2005, most of the EU GHG reductions cannot 
be credited to the EU-ETS.  A 2004 survey of CO2 based taxes found 
that they had contributed to the reduction of emissions.60  Dr. Mikael 
Skou Andersen notes, however, that “evaluating the impact of carbon-
energy taxes on CO2 emissions is complicated because taxes in certain 
sectors have replaced pre-existing energy taxes, but now come under a 
different name and with a modified tax base—carbon content rather than 
gigajoules.”61 
In Europe, interest has shifted from new carbon taxes towards a more 
complete reliance on the EU-ETS cap-and-trade system.62  The United 
Kingdom’s Climate Change levy, enacted in 2001, was the last carbon 
tax enacted in the EU.63  France considered a carbon tax in 2009, but 
abandoned the proposal due to political and legal obstacles.64  Ireland is 
 55. See Council Directive 2003/96, art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L 283) 54 (EC), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:283:0051:0070:EN:PDF 
(prohibiting levels of taxation for specified energy products and electricity from being below 
prescribed minimum levels of taxation). 
 56. Eurostat, supra note 54, at 160. 
 57. Energy and Environment Report 2008, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (EEA), 
10 (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/eea_report_2008_6. 
 58. EEA Report, supra note 58, at 83. 
 59. Id. 
 60. WTO-UNEP Report: Trade and Climate Change, DTI/1188/GE, (2009) (prepared 
by Ludivine Tamiotti et al.). 
 61. Anderson, supra note 50, at 65. 
 62. Speck, supra note 55, at 56. 
 63. A general guide to Climate Change Levy, HM Revenue & Customs, July 2010, 
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb
=true&_pageLabel=pageExcise_ShowContent&id=HMCE_CL_000290&property
Type=document#P28_2162. Accord Tamiotti et al., supra note 61, at 130 n.12 (stating that 
Switzerland, which is not an EU member, enacted a carbon tax on emissions from imported 
energy in 2008).  See CO2 levy on heating fuels to be introduced as of January 2008, 
THE FEDERAL AUTHORITY OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION, June 28, 2007, available at 
http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=13369 (Since 2008, 
Switzerland has had a tax on CO2 emissions from imported heating fossil fuels (e.g., heating 
oil, natural gas, coal, petroleum coke)). 
 64. See James Kanter and Matthew Saltmarsh, More in Europe Look to Carbon 
Tax to Curb Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009, (stating that French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy unveiled a proposal to tax carbon at 17 Euro per ton); Gabriele Parussini, 
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currently considering a carbon revenue levy, which is essentially an income 
tax on the value of free ETS allowances.65  Some European governments 
are considering repealing carbon and energy taxes on industries covered 
by the EU-ETS.66  Dr. Andersen expects CO2 emissions to increase if 
carbon costs decrease by the amount of the tax relief.  The additional 
emissions would need to be offset by additional allowances, causing an 
increase in the price of ETS allowances offsetting the value of the tax 
relief.67 
The United States is lagging far behind Europe in its climate change 
efforts.  Only two cities in the U.S.—Boulder, Colorado68 and San Francisco, 
California69— have enacted a carbon tax.  The Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) is a functioning cap-and-trade program covering power 
plant emissions across several Northeastern states.70  The Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI)71 and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Accord (MGGRA)72 are still in the planning stages.  At the federal level, 
the first comprehensive climate change bill, the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act (ACES, a.k.a. Waxman-Markey), passed the House of 
Representatives on June 26, 2009.73  Both cap-and-trade and a carbon 
tax will increase the cost of carbon-intensive activities and thus create 
incentives to conserve energy, improve energy efficiency, and adopt clean-
France Plans New Version of Carbon Tax, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2010 (describing the 
bill’s rejection by the Constitutional Council on grounds it violated equitable principles 
by having too many exemptions); Matthew Saltmarsh, France Abandons Plan for Carbon 
Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010. 
 65. Carbon Revenue Levy Bill 2010 (2010), available at http://www.oireachtas. 
ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2010/2810/b2810d.pdf. 
 66. Andersen, supra note 50, at 83. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Boulder voters pass first energy tax in the nation, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www. 
bouldercolorado.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6136&Itemid=169. 
 69. Kelly Zito, Air Quality Board to Fine Bay Area Polluters, S.F. CHRON., May 
22, 2008, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-05-22/news/17155215_1_carbon-
dioxide-greenhouse-gas-emissions. 
 70. RGGI States’ First CO2 Auction Off to a Strong Start, RGGI Inc., Sept. 29, 
2008, available at www.rggi.org/docs/rggi_press_9_29_2008.pdf (stating the RGGI held 
its first carbon auction on Sept. 28, 2008). 
 71. A Comprehensive Initiative, Western Climate Initiative, http://www.western 
climateinitiative.org/. (The WCI issued the initial phase of its design recommendations on 
Sept. 23, 2008. Its first compliance period begins in 2012). 
 72. Report, Final Recommendations of the Advisory Group, MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE 
GAS REDUCTION ACCORD, May 2010, http://www.midwesternaccord.org/Accord_Final 
_Recommendations.pdf. 
 73. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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energy technologies.  A carbon cap sets an absolute emission quantity 
limitation while a carbon tax limits the cost of carbon emission reduction.74  
While there are many reasons to prefer carbon taxes75 to a cap-and-trade 
system, and many do prefer carbon taxes,76 the most promising legislative 
solution is cap-and-trade.  In a choice between the perfect, the good, and 
the planet, I choose the good of the planet.77  The next step is to review 
common elements in a cap-and-trade system, and then consider how a 
cap-and-trade system would affect the existing tax system. 
III.  COMMON ELEMENTS OF CAP-AND-TRADE 
While cap-and-trade programs vary in their details, they all contain 
three essential elements: 1) the “cap,” which represents the annual 
allowable emissions of the targeted pollutant; 2) the allocation of rights, 
called allowances or permits, to emit the pollutant, which may be auctioned 
or given away; and 3) the “trade,” which requires the development of a 
secondary market where allowances may be bought and sold.  Cap-and-
trade programs also utilize additional features such as offsets, banking, 
borrowing, and safety values.  Offset provisions allow market participants 
to substitute investment in pollution mitigating activities for pollution 
allowances.  Banking permits market participants to carry over unused 
permits to future years.  Borrowing allows market participants to “borrow” 
allowances, rather than purchasing them.  Safety values may apply in the 
 74. See Roberta F. Mann, Waiting to Exhale: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 
AM U.L. REV. 1135, 1209 (2002). 
 75. Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and 
Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,118, 10,122 (2009) (“A carbon tax is better 
than a cap-and-trade system because of its simplicity, transparency, efficiency, and certainty 
[of cost].”). 
 76. See Mann, supra note 76; Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Our Epic Foolishness, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A27; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and David M. Uhlmann, Combating 
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming 
than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. L. REV. 3 (2009); Bruce Bartlett, A Carbon Tax is Better 
Than Cap-and-Trade, FORBES.COM (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/05/obama- 
carbon-tax-capand-trade opinionscolumnists_republicans_print.html; Gilbert E. Metcalf and 
David A. Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009); 
Michael Waggoner, How and Why to Tax Carbon, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
1 (2008); Ralph Nader and Toby Heaps, We Need A Global Carbon Tax, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 3, 2008, at A17; Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., The Real Generation X, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2008, at WK10; Carbon Tax & 100% Dividend vs. Tax & Trade*: Testimony of 
James E. Hansen 4273 Durham Road, Kintnersville, PA to Committee on Ways and Means 
United States House of Representatives, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www. 
columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2009/20090226_WaysAndMeans.pdf; Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New 
Agenda for Global Warming, 3 ECON. VOICE, July 2006, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=1210&context=ev. 
 77. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Perfect, the Good, the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, May 
18, 2009, at A23 (“So opponents of the proposed legislation [Waxman-Markey] have to ask 
themselves whether they’re making the perfect the enemy of the good. I think they are.”). 
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case of volatility in pollution allowance markets.  If a safety valve is 
triggered, the government will sell additional allowances at a specified 
safety valve price.  Recent legislative proposals have included many or all 
of the foregoing elements.  To the extent that particular elements pose 
either direct or indirect tax issues, they will be discussed below.  Finally, 
the goal of a cap-and-trade program is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.  This paper will also consider the possibility that certain tax 
provisions may enhance or conflict with that goal. 
IV.  THE CAP 
The imposition of a cap itself has no direct interaction with the tax 
system.  A cap without trading would not create any new asset to be 
accounted for under the tax system. A federal cap-and-trade program 
will affect the tax system in two broad indirect ways: 1) it will alter the 
effectiveness of energy tax incentives contained in the tax system under 
current law, and 2) alter the distributive pattern of tax burdens as a cap-
and-trade program is likely to impose a higher proportional costs on 
poor households.  A carbon tax regime raises the same issues, and would 
similarly increase the cost of carbon-intensive energy.  A cost increase is 
the essential part of any carbon mitigation system; the price signal 
reduces demand.  The cap is the primary cost driver for a cap-and-trade 
system, so the cap will influence effectiveness of existing tax incentives.  
The costs imposed by the cap will likely fall disproportionately on lower 
income persons.  The distributional inequity could be ameliorated by 
adjustments to the income and payroll tax systems.  This paper will first 
address the interaction between the cap and the tax incentives for energy 
and then discuss possibilities for evening the distributional burden. 
V.  TAX INCENTIVES 
Before 2007, the majority of energy subsidies provided through the 
Internal Revenue Code benefited the use of traditional fossil fuels.  After 
2007, renewable energy began receiving the majority of the tax benefits 
for energy, but fossil fuel sources still receive a significant amount of 
support through the tax system.78  Use of fossil energy results in greenhouse 
 78. Gilbert E. Metcalf, Taxing Energy in the United States: Which Fuels Does the 
Tax Code Favor?, MANHATTAN INST. ENERGY POL’Y & ENV’T 13 (2009) [hereinafter Metcalf, 
Tax Favored Fuels], available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/eper_04.htm. 
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gas (GHG) emissions, although the magnitude of the emissions depends on 
the particular fossil fuel source.79  Market mechanisms designed to reduce 
GHG emissions tend to increase the cost of using fossil fuel based energy.  
Tax subsidies tend to decrease the cost of the subsidized product.  Hence, it 
is possible that a cap-and-trade program could reduce the effectiveness of 
fossil fuel tax subsidies while increasing the effectiveness of renewable 
energy subsidies.  However, the interaction between a cap-and-trade program 
and a particular fuel subsidy is likely to be more complex depending 
upon the nature of the market for the fuel in question.80 
Tax incentives, also called tax expenditures or subsidies, reduce cost 
and convey benefit by reducing the tax burden on those who engage in 
the preferred activity.81  Tax incentives may assume different forms.  
They may be in the form of tax credits, which reduce tax liability dollar 
for dollar.  They may be in the form of reduced tax rates on income from 
the preferred activity.  They may provide additional deductions, which 
reduce taxable income.  They may be in the form of accelerated deductions, 
which convey benefit by reducing taxable income more rapidly than the 
normal rule. 
Oil and gas tax preferences in the Code include the credit for enhanced oil 
recovery costs,82 the marginal well tax credit,83 expensing of intangible 
drilling costs,84 the deduction for qualified tertiary injectants,85 percentage 
depletion for oil and natural gas,86 and a shortened amortization period 
 79. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Environment FAQs—Energy 
Information Administration, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ask/environment_faqs.asp (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2010) (For example, per million Btu generated, the following pounds of CO2 are 
emitted: gasoline—156; bituminous coal—205; natural gas—117). 
 80. See Robert M. Gordon, Matthew P. Haskins & James G. Rafferty, Tax Issues 
Associated with Climate Change Legislation, ABA TAX SECTION, Sept. 25, 2009, http:// 
meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/TX316500/newsletterpubs/ABATax
_Climate_Change_Legislation.ppt (2009). 
 81. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006) 
(tax expenditures are “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws 
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide 
a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability”); A Reconsideration of 
Tax Expenditure Analysis, JOINT STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110th Cong. 9 (2008) 
[hereinafter JCX-37-08] (tax subsidy is defined as “a specific tax provision that is 
deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (not a 
hypothetical ‘normal’ tax), and that collects less revenue than does the general rule.”). 
See Roberta F. Mann, Back to the Future: Recommendations and Predictions for Greener 
Tax Policy, 88 OR. L. REV. 355, 358–69 (2009) (a more detailed explanation of the tax 
expenditure budget and the recent modifications to the Joint Committee methodology). 
 82. I.R.C. § 43 (2010). 
 83. I.R.C. § 45I (2010). 
 84. I.R.C. § 263(c) (2010). 
 85. I.R.C. § 193(a) (2010). 
 86. I.R.C. § 613(a) (2010). 
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for geological and geophysical costs.87  Working interests in oil and gas 
property also benefit by exemption from the passive activity loss rules, 
which limit the deductibility of expenses from many passive investments.88  
Domestic oil and gas production activities qualify for the deduction for 
domestic production activities.89  The President’s fiscal year 2010 budget 
proposes eliminating several of the tax benefits for oil and gas.90  If the 
effect of the particular oil and gas subsidy is to favor domestically produced 
oil and gas over foreign oil and gas, then a cap-and-trade system would 
not alter such a relationship, which is based on a world market price for 
oil.91  The cost of both domestic and foreign oil would be increased by 
cap-and-trade, and the domestically produced oil would continue to have 
a cost advantage relative to foreign oil.  If the tax incentive equally benefits 
foreign and domestically produced oil, then the subsidy would have the 
effect of negating the cost increase due to cap-and-trade, and would 
restrain the desired shift to alternative fuels.  The deduction for tertiary 
injectants arguably encourages the sequestration of CO2, so may be viewed 
as consistent with the goals of a cap-and-trade program.  On the other 
hand, the cap-and-trade program itself, if it included offset provisions, 
would encourage using CO2 as a tertiary injectant, so the additional 
subsidy provided by the deduction may not be necessary. 
Coal, the most carbon intensive fuel, also receives tax benefits, including 
investment tax credits for clean coal92 and coal gasification projects93 as 
well as production tax credits for Indian coal94 and refined coal.95  
Subsidizing investment in clean coal technologies may ease the transition to 
a carbon-neutral energy system, as clean coal technologies facilitate the 
use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) techniques.  Tax subsidies for 
CCS technologies may be an appropriate means of smoothing the 
economic transition.  On the other hand, some may view continuing to 
subsidize coal as counter to the goal of shifting to a renewable energy 
 87. I.R.C. § 167(h)(1) (2010). 
 88. I.R.C. § 469(a)(1), (c)(3)(A) (2010). 
 89. I.R.C. § 199(a)(1)(A), (d)(9)(A) (2010). 
 90. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, OIL AND GAS TAX PROVISIONS: A CONSIDERATION 
OF THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL (Comm. Print 2009). 
 91. See Rafferty et al., supra note 81, at 1354, 1356. 
 92. I.R.C. § 48A(a) (2010). 
 93. I.R.C. § 48B(a) (2010). 
 94. I.R.C. § 45(a)-(c)(9) (2010). 
 95. I.R.C. § 45(a)-(c)(7) (2010). 
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based economy.96  As imported coal97 is not a significant factor in U.S. 
energy generation, domestic subsidies reduce the price of coal-fired 
energy and would negate the cost increase due to cap-and-trade. 
The marginal cost of cap-and-trade depends on the design elements of 
the scheme, such as the level of the emissions cap and the permissible 
sources of emission reductions (or offsets).  Those features of cap and 
trade also have consequences for the scheme’s interaction with existing 
tax incentives for renewable energy sources.  The relationship depends 
on whether the emissions reductions efforts occur inside the United 
States or abroad. 
Various sources of renewable and alternative energy receive federal 
tax subsidies, primarily in the form of production tax credits98 and/or 
investment tax credits.99  Qualified energy sources for the renewable 
electricity production credit include wind, closed-loop biomass, open-
loop biomass, geothermal energy, solar energy (placed in service before 
2006), small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower 
production, and marine and hydrokinetic energy.  Homeowners can 
receive personal tax credits for installing certain equipment that uses 
solar, wind, or geothermal power.100  There is also a production credit 
for new nuclear power.101  The investment tax credit applies to solar, 
geothermal, fuel cell, combined heat and power, and small wind electricity 
generation projects.  There is an investment tax credit for property used 
in a qualified advanced energy manufacturing process.102 
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) also includes tax subsidies for 
conservation of energy.103  For example, homeowners may receive tax 
credits for insulating their homes or installing more efficient heating 
systems.104  Consumers purchasing alternative fuel vehicles may be eligible 
for tax credits.105  Producers of energy-efficient appliances may be eligible 
for a tax credit.106  Owners of commercial property may receive a tax 
 96. See Roberta F. Mann, Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives 
Encourage Burning Coal and the Consequences for Global Warming, 20 GLOBAL BUS. 
& DEV. L.J. 111 (2006). 
 97. FRED FREME, U.S. COAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND: 2008 REVIEW 1 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/special/tbl1.html. 
 98. I.R.C. § 45 (West 2000). 
 99. I.R.C. § 48 (West 2009). 
 100. I.R.C. § 25(d) (West 2009). 
 101. I.R.C. § 45(j) (West 2009). 
 102. I.R.C. § 25(c) (West 2009). 
 103. Tax Expenditures for Energy Production and Conservation: Before the S. Comm. 
On Finance (2009) (statement of Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation), available at http://www. 
jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3555. 
 104. I.R.C. § 25(c) (West 2009). 
 105. I.R.C. §§ 30(b), (d) (West 2009). 
 106. I.R.C. § 45(m) (West 2008). 
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deduction for certain energy-efficient commercial building property 
expenditures.107 Taxpayers may exclude from taxable income any 
amount received from a public utility for the installation of an energy 
conservation measure.108  Energy conservation measure means any 
installation or modification primarily designed to reduce consumption of 
electricity or to improve the management of energy with respect to a 
dwelling unit.  In addition, many States provide tax incentives for renewable 
energy production and conservation.109 
If the cap-and-trade program only allows domestic reductions to count, 
then existing tax incentives for low-carbon energy and conservation would 
be factored into the market price of carbon allowances.  By making low-
carbon energy less costly, the tax incentives will lower the cost of carbon 
allowances by an equivalent amount.  In effect, the tax incentives will shift 
a portion of the cost of abatement to taxpayers and away from electricity 
ratepayers or other energy consumers.  A carbon tax scheme, in contrast, 
does not automatically adjust for changing abatement costs, but instead 
must be adjusted, either by design or regulation.110  If the cap-and-trade 
scheme allows foreign emission reduction credits, at least some of the 
emission reductions will occur outside the U.S.  As U.S. tax incentives 
do not affect the marginal cost of abatement abroad, the domestic incentives 
would no longer affect the price of carbon allowances.  Both the Senate-
proposed American Power Act and the House-passed ACES allow use of 
international allowances.111  Some may argue that subsidies for renewable 
energy will be redundant if cap-and-trade legislation increases the cost 
of fossil energy.112  Others may argue that incentives for renewable energy 
are still important because the technology for developing those energy 
sources is still in the early stages of development and because industry 
structure and regulation weaken incentives for investment.113  Consumer 
 107. I.R.C. § 179(d) (West 2008). 
 108. I.R.C. § 136 (1997). 
 109. For a helpful database of State renewable energy and conservation incentives, 
see www.dsire.org. 
 110. Rafferty et al., supra note 81, at 33. 
 111. See Pew Ctr. For Global Climate Change, Comparison of the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey) and the American Power Act (Kerry-
Liberman) 8 (June 2010), pew-comparison-matrix-wm-and-kl_0.pdf. 
 112. See Rafferty et al., supra note 81, at 27. 
 113. CBO Study, Fed. Climate Change Programs: Funding History and Policy Issues 15 
(2010) (“Notably, difficulties in engaging in a coordinated collected effort and sorting 
out the question of which consumers ultimately will bear the cost of new facilities could 
decrease or slow investments in renewable-energy generators and the transmission lines 
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incentives for conservation may still be required because the price signals 
from cap-and-trade may not be adequately reflected in consumer response.114  
On the other hand, pricing carbon is more efficient than subsidizing 
particular sources of energy.115  All tax incentives are not created equal, 
and different sources of energy receive markedly different levels of 
preference.116  It is particularly hard to incentivize low cost energy saving 
methods through tax benefits.  As one study observes: “[t]here is a tax 
credit to encourage people to reduce consumption of home heating oil by 
installing solar-powered heating units, but there is no similar incentive to 
turn down the thermostat or put on a sweater, even though doing so 
could reduce GHG emissions at lower cost than installing solar-powered 
heating units.”117  Significantly, tax incentives inevitably involve the 
government picking “technology winners.”  Professor Michael Waggoner 
asks, “[H]ow can the government determine whether subsidies to electric 
cars or wind generation or efficiency or something else will be more 
effective?  We would like to believe that legislation is the product of the 
combined wisdom of the legislators, but it may be more realistic to consider 
legislation as the product of trading votes and political power.”118 
VI.  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF CAP-AND-TRADE 
Most cap-and-trade schemes do not impose emissions caps on 
individuals.  Instead, as in the EU-ETS and both current U.S. cap-and-
trade proposals, the emissions cap covers power generators and fossil 
fuel producers and distributors.119  Although the incidence of the cap 
does not fall on individual consumers, households will bear the ultimate 
necessary to carry power from wind farms or solar arrays to densely populated and 
industrial areas where the electricity is consumed.”). 
 114. CBO Study, Fed. Climate Change Programs: Funding History and Policy Issues 
14–15 (2010) (explaining that builders and landlords often make the decision about 
which household appliances to purchase and about how much insulation a dwelling will 
have, while the buyers and tenants pay the monthly energy bills. The study concludes 
that “in the trade-off between energy efficiency and initial cost, the divergent incentives 
of landlords and developers and those of tenants and home buyers might not encourage socially 
optimal choices.”). 
 115. CBO Study, supra note 115, at 22. 
 116. Metcalf, supra note 77, at 9.  See also Joint Comm. on Taxation, Tax Expenditures 
for Energy Prod. And Conservation, JCX-25-09, at 117 (Apr. 21, 2009). 
 117. CBO Study, supra note 115, at 22. 
 118. Michael J. Waggoner, Critique of U.S. House Bill 2454 on Climate Change, 2 
AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM 61, 64 (2010). See also John M. Broder, With Something for 
Everyone, Climate Bill Passed, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
07/01/us/politics/01climate.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=john+broder&st=nyt (noting that the bill 
was full of special interest favors). 
 119. Pew Ctr. Comparison, supra note 111, at 1. 
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costs of cap-and-trade.120  Energy producers facing the cap may make 
their own emissions reductions by choosing less carbon intensive fuels 
or operating more efficiently, passing the costs of new equipment and 
higher priced fuel on to their customers.  Alternatively, energy producers 
can purchase emissions permits and pass the costs on to their consumers.  
On average, lower-income households pay a larger share of their income 
toward the costs of residential energy and transportation fuel.  A 
household’s energy burden refers to the amount of funds spent on 
residential energy relative to income.  The poorest households have a 
median energy burden of 15.3%; low-income households have a median 
energy burden of 9.5%, while non-low-income households have a 
median energy burden of 3.1%.121  A cap-and-trade program that does 
not address the increased costs faced by low-income households could 
result in the lowest income group bearing a cost almost five times that of 
the highest income group.122 Interestingly, the consumption patterns of 
the highest income households result in more than three times the carbon 
emissions of the lowest income households, although representing a 
much lower proportion of the highest income households’ incomes.123  
The cost impact will occur whether the emission permits are allocated 
for free or auctioned, as the cap itself will restrict the ability to use carbon- 
emitting fuels.  If permits are auctioned, it will generate government 
revenue that could be distributed to disproportionately affected households. 
Congress could use a variety of options to reduce the cap-and-trade 
program’s disparate impact on low-income households.  Policies that 
disproportionately burden the poor are called regressive; policies that 
impose greater burdens on the wealthy are called progressive.  Tax 
related options to address cap-and-trade’s regressivity include: energy 
tax credits for low and/or middle-income households with earned income or 
 120. Corbett A. Grainger & Charles D. Kolstad, Who Pays a Price on Carbon?, 46 
ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 359, 360 (2010). 
 121. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & LIBBY PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40841, 
ASSISTING HOUSEHOLDS WITH THE COSTS OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: OPTIONS AND 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2009). 
 122. See Dallas Burtraw et al., The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Alternative 
Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auction 2, 6–7 (Res. for the Future, Paper No. 
RFF DP 09-17-REV, 2009), available at http://rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails. 
aspx?PublicationID=20778. 
 123. Grainger & Kolstad, supra note 121, at 12 tbl.4 (comparing mean household 
emissions for Quintile 1 (27.47) with those for Quintile 5 (93.96)).  On a per capita basis, 
the lowest income households emitted 15.2 CO2 equivalents while the highest income 
households emitted 30.3. 
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qualifying retirement income, adding an energy component to the 
Earned Income Tax credit, and reducing Social Security payroll taxes.  
Considerations in choosing a method include: the ability to reach 
households, administrative feasibility, consumer flexibility, tailoring benefits 
for household size and income, accounting for regional differences, 
and promoting energy efficiency. 
Using either the income tax system or the payroll tax system would 
reach working households.  If the cap-and-trade program does not generate 
auction revenue, cutting taxes would increase the deficit.  Cutting payroll 
taxes could threaten the viability of the Social Security system.  Using 
the tax system to deliver funds would not require a new administrative 
infrastructure, although it would place additional burdens on the tax 
system.  By reducing tax liability or creating a refund, a tax credit would 
provide funds that could be used by households in a flexible way to 
meet energy needs or for any other purpose.  As the income tax system 
already tracks household size by dependency exemptions, the benefit 
could be easily tailored.  Accounting for regional differences in energy 
prices would require additional information to be submitted, and possibly 
third party reporting by energy providers.  As an important part of the 
effectiveness of cap-and-trade is the delivery of a price signal, e.g., higher 
GHG emitting fuels should cost more, reducing the price by redistribution 
of funds weakens the effectiveness of the program.  If funds are tied to 
energy expenditures, like the Low Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program (LIHEAP), it may lead to higher energy use by low-income 
households.124  The House-passed bill, ACES, would use the proceeds 
from auctioning 15 percent of the allowances to make cash payments to 
eligible low-income households to reimburse them for the estimated loss 
in purchasing power resulting from the legislation.125  The Senate proposal, 
the American Power Act, would use the proceeds from the auction of 
approximately 12 percent of the allowances to provide an energy refund 
and the working families refundable credit.126 
Some legislative proposals have included an equal per capita dividend 
of cap-and-trade auction revenues,127 based on the theory that all 
households will bear the burden of higher energy costs and thus should 
 124. For example, for fiscal year 1997, the average LIHEAP household consumed about 
5.7 percent more energy than the average low income household. See ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN 
ENERGY MARKETS 1999: ENERGY TRANSFORMATION AND END USE 8–9 (2000), available 
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy1/pdf/sroiaf(2000)02.pdf. 
 125. See PEW CTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 111, at 3. 
 126. Id. 
 127. The Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S. 2877, 
111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009). 
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share the benefits of government revenues generated by auction of cap-
and-trade permits.  The tax consequences of such payments should be 
considered.  Such payments are similar to Alaska’s permanent fund 
dividends, which are a per capita distribution of a portion of Alaska’s oil 
revenues to Alaska residents.  Alaska permanent fund dividends are taxable 
income for federal purposes.128  On the other hand, energy conservation 
subsidies provided by public utilities are not taxed to the recipients.129  
While the cost of cap-and-trade permits should have the effect of 
encouraging energy conservation, the receipt of cap-and-trade dividends 
would not encourage energy conservation.  Surprisingly, one study finds 
that per capita dividends to be the most progressive way to mitigate the 
regressive effect of carbon pricing.130  Another study found that taxing 
the per capita dividend produced an even more progressive effect.131 
Behavioral research suggests that making a cap-and-trade scheme fair 
to the poor may be much more complex.  Reviewing proposals to 
mitigate the disproportionate impact of carbon pricing, Professors Brian 
Galle and Manuel Utset observe that rebates may be ineffective in easing 
the burden on the poor.132  They note that an end of the year rebate does 
not help a household face increased expenses if the household does not 
have adequate liquidity to meet the ongoing expenses or ability to borrow at 
a reasonable cost.133  Moreover, the problem cannot be easily solved by 
front-loading the rebate  (“prebate”) as immediately available funds may 
induce lower income households to over-consume carbon intensive 
products.134  Their interesting proposal to overcome these problems is a 
self-directed debit card.135  The debate about the most effective way to 
mitigate the regressive effect of carbon pricing mirrors the debate about 
 128. Permanent Fund Dividend Division: Tax Reporting, STATE OF ALASKA-PERMANENT 
FUND DIVIDEND DIVISION, http://www.pfd.state.ak.us/taxes/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 
2010). 
 129. I.R.C. § 136 (2006). 
 130. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, A Proposal for a U.S. Carbon Tax Swap: An Equitable 
Tax Reform to Address Global Climate Change 18 (The Brookings Inst., Hamilton Project, 
Discussion Paper No. 2007-12, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/files/ 
rc/papers/2007/10carbontax_metcalf/10_carbontax_metcalf.pdf. 
 131. Burtraw et al., supra note 123, at 14. 
 132. Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Short-Sighted 
Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law 
Research Paper, Paper #444, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576263. 
 133. Id. at 16. 
 134. Id. at 43. 
 135. Id. at 62. 
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the most effective means for carbon pricing.  It is important to 
consider fairness, but as in the design of climate mitigation, the perfect 
should not be the enemy of the good.136 
A carbon tax, which would also raise prices on energy intensive goods 
and services, would likely have effects similar to those described above 
on existing tax incentives and poor households.  However, a carbon tax 
would raise revenue to ameliorate the effects.  A cap-and-trade scheme 
only raises government revenue when the allowances are auctioned.  Both 
of the proposals pending in Congress give away the majority of the 
allowances, at least in the first years of the programs.137  The Center for 
Budget and Policy Priorities concluded, however, that both proposals 
adequately met “the goal of protecting the typical household in the 
poorest fifth of the population from incurring a financial loss as a result 
of policies necessary to fight global warming.”138 
VII.  THE ALLOWANCES 
The second essential element of a cap-and-trade system is the 
allowance, or carbon permit.  The cap is divided into allowances, each of 
which authorizes the holder to emit the applicable unit of carbon, usually 
one (metric) ton of CO2 equivalent.139  The scheme is designed so that 
allowances are valuable market commodities.  A Congressional Research 
Service report noted that “allocating allowances is essentially allocating 
money with the marketplace determining the exchange rate.”140  Both the 
IRS and the recipients of the allowances need to know: 1) whether and 
when the initial receipt of allowances constitutes taxable income, 2) the 
tax basis of the allowance, 3) whether the cost of acquiring an allowance 
is deductible, 4) if the cost of acquiring the allowance is not deductible, 
when and if such cost can be recovered through depreciation or amortization, 
and 5) how the sale of an allowance will be taxed.  This section will cover 
the first four issues.  The last issue will be covered in the following section 
on “trading.” 
The first two issues turn on whether the allowances will be freely 
allocated or auctioned.  The tax considerations are simpler if the permits 
 136. Id. at 60 (“We do not propose, though, to maintain fairness even if it means the 
polar icecaps melt.”). 
 137. Pew Center for Global Climate Change, supra note 112, at 2–3. 
 138. DOTTIE ROSENBAUM, CHAD STONE & HANNAH SHAW, CENTER FOR BUDGET AND 
POLICY PRIORITIES, HOW LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS WOULD FARE UNDER THE KERRY-
LIEBERMAN CLIMATE-CHANGE BILL 7 (2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-24-10climate.pdf. 
 139. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION: TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
2 (June 12, 2009), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Joint%20Committee 
%20on%20Taxation.pdf. 
 140. Parker, supra note 45, at CRS-27. 
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are auctioned.  If a power plant pays $100 for the right to emit a ton of 
CO2 equivalent in 2012, then under normal tax rules that apply to most 
assets, the power plant has acquired an asset with a basis of $100.141  As 
the power plant has paid full fair market value, it has no accession to 
wealth and thus no taxable income.  If the power plant sells the permit 
rather than using it, it will calculate its gain or loss using the $100 
basis.142  Furthermore, if the cost is deductible, the power plant will have 
a $100 deduction.143  If the cost is treated as a capital expenditure, the 
amortizable basis will be $100.144 
Commentators have argued vigorously that all allowances should be 
auctioned.145  Arguments for auctions include that auctions create a level 
playing field between existing entities and new firms, and that the 
auctions improve market liquidity and transparency.146  President Obama 
advocated a cap-and-trade system with 100 percent auctioned allowances 
during his Presidential campaign.  The primary argument against free 
allowances is that they provide a windfall to the firm, which will pass 
the cost of restricting carbon on to its customers anyway.  Although it 
has been argued that free allowances are necessary to reduce cost increases 
to consumers, economic analysis shows that free allowances do not prevent 
cost increases.  Because allowances have economic value, if a firm uses 
the allowance to emit carbon, it foregoes the opportunity to cash in by 
selling the allowance.  Thus, the firm will pass the cost of using the 
allowance on to its customers,147 creating wealth for shareholders at the 
expense of (generally) poorer customers.  It also constrains revenue 
available to the government for mitigating the regressive effect of carbon 
pricing.  The free allocation program under the EU-ETS produced windfalls 
for the allowance recipients.148  In the EU scheme, the power producers 
succeeded in marking up the market price of electricity to include the 
opportunity-cost value of the allowances.149  A research paper by Deutsche 
 141. See 26 U.S.C. § 1012 (2010). 
 142. See 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2010). 
 143. See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2010). 
 144. I.R.C. §§ 263, 167 (2010). 
 145. See, e.g., Alan D. Viard, Don’t Give Away the Cap-and-Trade Permits!, 123 TAX 
NOTES 613 (May 4, 2009) (also citing five other analysts with similar views, see id. at 618). 
 146. Parker, supra note 45, at CRS-15. 
 147. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO2 
EMISSIONS 5 (2007), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/80xx/doc8027/04-25-Cap_Trade.pdf. 
 148. Parker, supra note 45, at CRS-27. 
 149. Id. 
 167 
 
MANN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2016  12:22 PM 
 
Bank concluded that the EU-ETS failed as a market mechanism: “the 
result is a greenhouse gas reduction scheme that is influenced as much or 
more by national policy than by the emissions marketplace.”150 
However, as noted above, the bulk of the allowances in either pending 
legislative proposal will be freely allocated.  As a general principle of 
tax law, all benefits received are taxable unless a specific statutory 
exclusion applies.151  In addition to the statutory exclusions, unrealized 
appreciation and imputed income also escape taxation.  Unrealized 
appreciation represents the increase in value of assets held by the taxpayer, 
which is generally not taxed unless a specific statutory provision requires it 
to be taxed.152  Imputed income represents the value of self-performed 
services, like mowing your own lawn, or the value of using a durable asset, 
like the rental value of your principal residence.153  Freely allocated 
carbon permits would appear to be taxable unless specifically excluded 
by statute.  However, the same would be true of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxide (SOx and NOx) permits freely allocated under the Clean Air Act, 
and the IRS ruled that no tax results from the receipt of SOx and NOx 
permits.154  Thus, it seems at least possible that firms could avoid taxation 
on the receipt of carbon permits. 
The tax consequences of receipt determine the tax basis of the permits.  
If the recipient is taxed on receipt, then the permit’s basis is the amount 
taken into income, the fair market value of the permit.155  If the recipient 
avoids tax on receipt, then the permit’s basis is zero.  An intermediate 
option would be permitting receipt of allowances without current tax 
consequences, but requiring tax inclusion upon surrender of the permits.156  
Except for timing issues, the result of these options would be the same.  
Because of the timing issues, however, commentators recommend 
 150. Id. at CRS-28. 
 151. Examples include the exclusion for gifts and inheritances, I.R.C. § 102 (2010), 
and the exclusion for damages received on account of personal physical injury, I.R.C.     
§ 104 (2010). 
 152. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 475 (2010), requiring securities dealers to recognize unrealized 
gains and losses by “marking-to-market” their inventory at the end of each taxable year. 
 153. See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 3.02 (unrealized appreciation) and ¶ 3.03 
(imputed income) (2d ed. 2009). 
 154. Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15. 
 155. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d). 
 156. This option would be analogous to the receipt of property by a service provider 
as compensation. Under IRC § 83(a), the service provider usually has income in the 
amount of the fair market value of the property when received. If the property is subject 
to a substantial risk of forfeiture or is non-transferable (e.g., a stock option which may 
not be transferred until after a number of years of employment), the service provider need not 
take the value into income until the restriction is lifted. Alternatively, the service provider may 
elect to take the value of the property into income immediately. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2004). 
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taxing receipt of free permits.157  Consider the following hypothetical: 
Power plant “A” receives a carbon permit for $100.  “A” takes $100 into 
taxable income.  “A” uses the permit in the same taxable year and is 
allowed a $100 deduction.  The $100 deduction would cancel out the $100 
of income, leaving a net income of zero.  If “A” had to purchase the 
carbon permit on the market, the same result would obtain.  Now assume 
instead that Power Plant “B” may exclude the $100 value of its carbon 
permit from income. When “B” uses the carbon permit, its deduction 
will be zero, again leaving a net income of zero. What if “B” could bank 
the permit for use in future years?  “B” can defer income from the tax-
free receipt of the permit by holding the permit and not using it.158  Of 
course, “B” would either have to suffer a business decline or spend on 
increased efficiency (or offsets) to meet the cap.159  But what if “B” could 
also borrow a permit (or borrow money to acquire a permit) to use this 
year?  Borrowing is not included in taxable income because of the 
obligation to repay.  “B” could potentially get basis in the borrowed 
permit, deduct the cost of the permit and the interest costs, and still defer 
the income of the freely allocated permit.  “B” can defer the income as long 
as the banked permit does not expire.  “B” could enter into a forward 
contract to sell the permit to another power plant for future use, continuing 
to defer taxation until the forward contract is settled.160  Depending on 
the flexibility of the cap-and-trade scheme, “B” could reap substantial 
value from deferral.  Furthermore, the tax preference for banking will 
increase the cost of carbon mitigation, because fewer permits will be for 
sale and thus will command a higher price.161  The researchers who have 
analyzed this issue in detail argue that freely allocated carbon permits 
 157. See Ethan Yale, Taxing Cap-and-Trade Environmental Regulation, 37 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 535, 536 (2008) (finding that the income tax can distort decisions whether to save 
permits for future use); Gary M. Lucas, Jr., The Taxation of Emissions Permits Distributed for 
Free as Part of a Carbon Cap-And-Trade Program, 1 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. 
L. 1, 3 (2010). 
 158. Lucas, supra note 158, at 16 (noting that if a firm banks its permits, it matters a 
great deal whether those permits were included or excluded from income.). 
 159. Lucas notes that even if B spends on abatement, and then banks the permit, the 
likely appreciation in the value of the permit, which will be untaxed, will give B a 
substantial benefit.  Lucas, supra note 158, at 24. 
 160. A forward contract is a contract to buy or sell a commodity on a future date for 
a set price. It may be cash settled or physically settled. Forward contracts are taxed like 
options. The granting of an option does not result in a taxable event to the grantor. 
Bittker & McMahon, ¶ 28.01, p. 28–19. 
 161. Lucas, supra note 158, at 25. 
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should result in taxable income for the recipient.162  On the other hand, 
Congressional Research Service analysis of the implications of transaction 
costs and taxes on sulfur dioxide allowance trading found only limited 
reasons to expect any influence of the tax system on allowance trading.163  
The experience of the EU-ETS is no help in this regard, as the Phase 1 
pilot program did not allow banking.  One study concludes that the failure to 
allow banking made the EU-ETS less liquid and therefore less efficient.164 
The prior discussion assumes that the cost of carbon allowances would 
be deductible when used.  However, whether the cost of allowances should 
be deducted or amortized remains an open question.  The allowances 
could be treated as an intangible property right—the right to emit carbon.  
Intangible assets are generally amortizable over 15 years, if they are 
amortizable at all.165  Again, the appropriate answer depends on the details 
of the cap-and-trade program.  If allowances can only be used in the current 
year, then the cost of allowances should be currently deductible.166  
The pending proposals both allow unlimited banking of permits.167  The 
proposals also allow borrowing.  Banking and borrowing mean that permits 
may be used beyond the current year.  However, the regulations provide 
an exception to the general rule of 15-year amortization for rights to a 
fixed amount.168  In the case of sulfur dioxide allowances, the IRS allows a 
deduction in the year of surrender.169 
VIII.  OFFSETS 
The pending cap-and-trade proposals both allow participants to use 
offset investments to meet their obligations under the cap.  Carbon tax 
advocates cite carbon “leakage” from unreliable offset projects as one of 
the reasons to favor carbon taxes over cap-and-trade.170  “In a carbon 
bubble, unscrupulous intermediaries may overpromise on offset projects 
by selling future credits based on projects that do not yet exist, are not 
additional, or which simply do not deliver the promised GHG reductions.  
This would not only have financial impacts, but also environmental 
 162. See Yale, supra note 158; see also Lucas, supra note 158. 
 163. LARRY B. PARKER & DONALD W. KIEFER, IMPLEMENTING SULFUR DIOXIDE 
ALLOWANCE TRADING: IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSACTION COSTS AND TAXES, CRS REPORT 
93-313, Mar. 12, 1993. 
 164. Daskalakis & Markellos, supra note 40, at 116. 
 165. I.R.C. § 197 (2004). 
 166. IRC § 162 (2010); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1994). 
 167. JASANOFF, supra note 5. 
 168. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-14(c)(2)(ii) (1971). 
 169. Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503. 
 170. See, e.g., MANN, Carbon Tax, supra note 10,121 (noting that offsets and international 
credits pose significant compliance issues). 
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consequences, as economies fail to meet GHG reduction targets.”171  
Carbon offsets are projects that absorb or sequester carbon.  The offset 
project generates the equivalent of an emission allowance, which could 
be sold and traded in the same manner as emission allowances allocated 
or sold by a governmental agency.  Assume that Power Plant “C” received 
permits to emit 100 tons of CO2 equivalents.  Power plant “C” planned 
to emit 150 tons.  “C” could either purchase 50 permits on the market, or 
invest in a carbon-offset project that would absorb 50 tons of CO2 
equivalents.  Both pending proposals allow investment in verified 
domestic or international offset projects to partially fulfill participants’ 
requirements under the cap.172  Under ACES, for example, qualifying 
domestic offset projects would include winter cover cropping and 
reforestation of unforested land.173  The American Power Act includes 
similar agricultural and forestry projects as qualified offsets.174  The 
agriculture and the forestry industries each have their own special tax 
provisions, so the tax treatment of the offset projects will depend upon 
the nature of the project and whether the generation of offsets is the 
primary objective of the project.175 
The Joint Committee on Taxation identified numerous tax issues relating 
to carbon offsets, including: 
• How does the taxpayer determine its basis in the offsets? 
• Are all costs incurred with respect to the project included in the 
basis of the offset where the principal purpose of the project is 
to obtain the offset?  If allocation is required, how is such 
allocation determined? 
• When are such costs recognized (e.g., expensed as incurred, 
included in basis and recognized when the offset is sold)? 
• Are the continued maintenance costs of a project undertaken 
primarily to generate offsets deductible as incurred?176 
 171. Subprime Carbon, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, http://www.foe.org/pdf/Subprime 
CarbonReport.pdf. 
 172. Pew Center Comparison, supra note 5. 
 173. H.R. 2454, Title V, § 503, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 174. The American Power Act, Title II, Part D, § 734, (111th Cong., 2d Sess. 2010). 
 175. For a detailed analysis of tax issues relating to agriculture, see BNA TAX MGT. 
PORTFOLIO, INCOME, DEDUCTIONS, CREDITS AND COMPUTATION OF TAX, 505-3rd T.M. VI-B. 
For a detailed analysis of tax issues relating to the timber industry, see BNA Tax Mgt. 
Portfolio 505-3rd T.M. VI-C. 
 176. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111th Cong., supra note 140, at 16. 
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The Joint Committee concluded that the rules governing the treatment 
of offset production costs should be coordinated with the rules governing 
income inclusion upon receipt of allocated emission allowances.177 
IX.  THE TRADE 
The “trade” part of cap-and-trade is theoretically essential to obtain 
carbon emissions reductions at the lowest cost.  In theory, covered firms 
would be able to identify and compare the cost of self-funded abatement 
with the cost of acquiring additional permits from firms that have a 
lower cost of abatement.  Several tax issues arise.  First of which is whether 
the carbon allowance is a capital asset or not.  The tax consequences of the 
sale of any asset depends upon its tax characterization.  Sale of capital 
assets generally produce capital gains or losses.178  For individuals, long-
term capital gain is taxed at a preferential rate, usually 15 percent.179  
Capital losses may reduce capital gain, and for individuals only, a limited 
amount of ordinary income.180  If the asset is not a capital asset, its sale 
produces ordinary income or loss.  Inventory and supplies regularly used 
in a trade or business are not capital assets.181  The IRS held sulfur dioxide 
(SOx) allowances to be capital assets.182  The IRS also ruled that EU-
ETS carbon emission allowances are capital assets.183  Thus, if carbon 
allowances are distributed to covered firms for free, the basis is zero.  
Upon sale of the allowances, all of the proceeds will be capital gains.  
The Joint Committee observed that: “[t]his approach would not provide 
parity between taxpayers (non-dealers) that sell allowances and those 
that surrender allowances to meet their obligations under a cap-and-trade 
system, because the latter would receive an ordinary deduction equal to 
their basis in the surrendered allowances.”184  While it is not perfectly 
clear what the Joint Committee means by that statement, it appears that 
recipients of freely allocated “tax-free” allowances would be placed in a 
better financial position by selling, rather than surrendering them. The 
IRS has also allowed tax-deferred exchanges of differently dated SOx 
allowances under the like-kind exchange rules.185 
Determining the tax consequences of receiving and transferring carbon 
allowances is simple compared to determining the tax consequences of 
 177. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111th Cong., supra note 140, at 17. 
 178. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221, 1222 (2006). 
 179. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2006). 
 180. I.R.C. § 1211 (2006). 
 181. I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), (a)(8) (2006). 
 182. Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503, 1992 WL 320322. 
 183. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200825009 (June 20, 2008), 2008 WL 2469944. 
 184. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111th Cong., supra note 140, at 19. 
 185. I.R.C. § 1031 (2010); Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503. 
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financial derivatives based on carbon allowances.  Taxation of financial 
derivatives is complex because the instruments are complex and sometimes 
deliberately opaque.  It is difficult to determine the tax ownership of the 
underlying asset, which affects tax treatment.  It is difficult to determine 
whether the income streams from the instrument constitute debt or equity, 
which affects tax treatment.186  To some commentators, the carbon market 
is the most dangerous part of cap-and-trade.187  The Friends of the Earth 
produced a report drawing an analogy between the potential carbon 
derivatives market under a cap-and-trade system with the market in 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which led to the burst in the housing 
bubble and the collapse of the financial markets in late 2008.188  An 
economist finds two dangers in energy derivatives trading: mispricing and 
illiquidity.189  She writes, “[l]ike credit derivatives, energy derivatives can 
be similar to hell: easy to enter and impossible to exit.”190 
Derivatives are so called because they derive their value from an 
underlying asset, such as a mortgage or a carbon permit.  Financial 
derivatives include options, forward contracts, futures contracts, and 
interest rate swaps.191  Derivatives can represent a long position, meaning 
that the value of the derivative fluctuates in the same direction as the value 
of the underlying asset.  For example, the value of an option to buy stock 
(a call option) at $100 per share will increase as the market value of the 
stock increases above $100 per share.  Derivatives can represent a short 
position, meaning that the value of the derivative fluctuates in the opposite 
direction as the value of the underlying asset.  For example, the value of 
 186. Debt instruments usually produce interest taxable to the holder at ordinary tax 
rates and a deduction for the borrower. I.R.C. § 163 (2010). Equity instruments produce 
dividends that may be taxed to the holder at reduced rates and no deduction to the issuer. 
I.R.C. § 1(h) (2010). Put-call parity allows financial derivatives to be structured at will to 
create debt or equity. See Hans R. Stoll, The Relation Between Put and Call Prices, 44 J. 
FIN. 801 (1969).  See also Michael Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 61 (2002). 
 187. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, SUBPRIME CARBON? RE-THINKING THE WORLD’S LARGEST 
NEW DERIVATIVE MARKET, available at www.foe.org/pdf/SubprimeCarbonReport.pdf. 
 188. Id. at 4. 
 189. Chiara Oldani, Energy Derivatives: The Source of the Next Crisis?, THE ICFAI 
READER, SPECIAL ISSUE (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1486036. 
 190. Id. at 4. 
 191. Jonas Monast ET AL, U.S. Carbon Market Design: Regulating Emission Allowances 
as Financial Instruments 7–8 (Duke University Climate Change Policy Partnership, 
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an option to sell stock (a put option) for $100 per share will decline as 
the value of the stock increases above $100 per share.  Derivatives have 
their own vocabulary.  A premium is the price paid for purchasing an 
option.  For example, Homer pays Mr. Burns $10 for the right to purchase 
Animatronix stock for $100 per share by December 19.  The strike price 
is the price paid for exercising an option.  If Homer exercises the option, 
he will pay a strike price of $100 per share.  Most options have an 
expiration date, the date by which the option must be exercised or lapse.  
If Homer fails to exercise his option by December 19, Mr. Burns will 
keep his $10 and Homer loses the right to purchase the stock at the strike 
price.  Mr. Burns will not be taxed until either Homer exercises the option 
or the option lapses.  The grant of an option is not generally considered a 
realization event under the federal income tax system.192 
Derivatives can be used as a hedge to protect businesses from risk.  
Company CP makes sweeteners and other products based on corn.  CP 
purchases a corn futures contract193 that requires it to purchase corn at 
$100 per bushel on a date two years in the future.  CP has now locked in 
the cost of supply at $100 and protected its business from price increases 
over $100.  In two years, if the price of corn is $250, CP will either buy 
corn at $100 (physical settlement) or will receive a $150 payment (cash 
settlement).  If instead the price of corn is $90, CP will likely cash settle 
the contract for $10.  If a derivative instrument that would otherwise be a 
capital asset, like a corn future, is used as a hedge against business risk, 
then the gains and losses recognized on the disposition of that asset will 
be treated as ordinary.194 
Investors (or speculators, if you prefer) also purchase derivatives.  In 
essence, a derivative is a wager on which way the price of an asset will 
vary.195  In the energy sector, as in the financial sector, the business needing 
risk management can become the speculator.  A commentator, arguing 
 192. But see I.R.C. § 1259 (2010) (requiring realization and recognition of gain for 
a “short sale against-the-box”). See Lee A. Sheppard, Borrowing All the Way to a 
Constructive Sale, 84 TAX NOTES 816 (Aug. 9, 1999). 
 193. A futures contract is a forward contract (an obligation to buy a commodity for 
a specified price on a specified date) that is publicly traded on a futures exchange. 
 194. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(7) (2010). Generally, to receive ordinary tax treatment the 
taxpayer must identify the transaction as a hedging transaction.  I.R.C. § 1221(b)(2) (2010). 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b) defines a hedging transaction as a transaction entered into in 
the ordinary course of business primarily to (inter alia) manage the risk of price changes.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b) (2010). 
 195. “Overall, we can put hedging and traditional gambling contracts on the same 
spectrum.  To some extent, they are all contracts that allow people to make profits or 
avoid loss from predicting future uncertainties.” CHAO-HUNG CHRISTOPHER CHEN, DIVIDING 
HEDGING AND GAMBLING: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 1 (2006). 
Chen also notes that insurance contracts fall along this spectrum. 
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for regulatory oversight of energy derivative markets, advised policy-
makers to remember Enron: 
“[Enron] started as a provider of natural gas and electricity.  Like energy companies 
today, it also claimed to use derivatives for hedging.  But as it grew, Enron 
gradually morphed into what amounted to a giant, and utterly reckless, trading firm.  
To put it another way, a benign energy provider that is shielded from regulation 
today could in time evolve into a far more malevolent beast, especially as the 
line between hedging and trading for profit erodes.”196 
The EU-ETS experience raises a cautionary tale.  During Phase 1, oil 
and natural gas price changes were the most important variable in 
determining allowance price changes.197  The Congressional Research 
Service notes that “[t]his apparent linkage between allowance price changes 
and price changes in two commodities markets raises the possibility of 
market manipulation, particularly with the inclusion of financial instruments 
such as options and futures contracts.”198  Even so, the EU experience 
may not foreshadow all the dangers faced by the potential U.S. market in 
carbon derivatives.  In the EU-ETS, the majority of trades involve the 
carbon allowances themselves, not derivatives, and the allowances are 
physically settled.199  The U.S. cap-and-trade scheme envisions derivative 
trading,200 and unlike the EU-ETS Phase I, both pending legislative 
proposals allow significant time-shifting of the carbon allowances.201 
As noted above, the use of financial derivatives may allow tax deferral 
because the grant of an option or like instrument is not a realization 
event.  The tax treatment of any derivative instrument depends on many 
factors, such as whether the instrument is held in the course of business 
or as an investment or whether it is considered to be debt or equity.202  
 196. Alain Sherter, Financial Reform: Why Shielding Energy Firms From Derivatives 
May Be Nuts, BNET, 3 (May 28, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/financial-business/ 
financial-reformwhy-shielding-energy-firmsfrom derivatives-rules-may-benuts/5929. 
 197. Parker, supra note 45, at CRS-29. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Gronewold, supra note 40, at 2. 
 200. Id.  However, Dr. Oldani notes that cash settled derivatives are less likely to 
cause an “energy crunch” than physically settled derivatives. Oldani, supra note 191, at 4. 
 201. Pew Comparison, supra note 111, at 5, 7; see also Jonas Monast, Jon Anda & Tim 
Profeta, U.S. Carbon Market Design: Regulating Emissions Allowances as Financial 
Instruments, DUKE UNIVERSITY, Feb. 2009, at 8, 15, available at http://www.nicholas. 
duke.edu/ccpp/ccpp_pdfs/carbon_market_primer.pdf. 
 202. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO 
TAX TREATMENT OF DERIVATIVES (JCX-21-08), at 12 (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www. 
financial-spreadbetting.com/tax-derivatives.pdf; see also Kevin J. Liss, The Option 
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Congress will have to decide whether to specify the tax treatment of 
carbon derivatives or whether to leave the decision to the IRS and the 
courts.203  In response to the concerns about carbon market bubbles, 
Congress has considered limiting access to the carbon markets to 
“registered participants.”204  On the other hand, broader participation by 
investors could make the carbon market more efficient and more liquid.  
As the Joint Committee on Taxation noted, “Tax rules that make a 
secondary market less transparent and/or less liquid could undermine the 
efficacy of the cap-and-trade program, which relies on the secondary 
markets to allocate the emission allowances efficiently.”205 
It is unclear which particular tax rules would make the market less 
transparent or liquid.  The foregoing discussion may have raised a mental 
fog thicker than any greenhouse gas.  To attempt to clarify, the tax system 
should consider the following issues with respect to trading of carbon 
allowances: 
• Should investors and firms covered under the cap-and-trade 
scheme be treated differently? 
• Should participants in the carbon markets be able to defer 
gain or loss, and for how long? 
• Should explicit tax rules be provided for carbon allowances 
and their derivatives, or should Congress rely on the IRS and 
the courts? 
A carbon tax would raise none of these issues, as it would not create a 
new financial instrument. 
X.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES 
A discussion of the U.S. tax system relating to cross-border business 
activities affected by cap-and-trade is beyond the scope of this article.  
In general, those issues turn on the characterization of the allowance or 
Conundrum in Tax Law: After All These Years, What Exactly is an Option?, 63 TAX LAWYER 
307 (2010), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1100/. 
 203. The Joint Committee observed: “[T]here are dangers inherent in developing 
statutory rules for every new financial product.  First, instruments can often be replicated 
through combinations of other instruments, thereby undoing some of the categorizations 
contemplated by new statutes. Second, drawing the line between different instruments 
(i.e., assigning one instrument to one cubbyhole, and another to a different one) itself can 
be very difficult, and may result in economically similar instruments being taxed quite 
differently.” JCX-21-08, supra note 204, at 13. 
 204. Gronewold, supra note 40, at 1. 
 205. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION: TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
2, at 24 (June 12, 2009). 
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derivative for U.S. tax purposes, as covered in the previous discussion.206  
International trade issues, however, raise unique concerns.  Congress has 
tried to use the tax system to accomplish international trade goals for 
years, with some unfortunate results.207  The prior disputes with the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) involved export-related tax benefits.  
The WTO found that those tax benefits were prohibited export subsidies 
that violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).208  
The tariff on imported ethanol, designed to protect the domestic ethanol 
industry, has also been challenged under WTO rules.209  One of the main 
political arguments against U.S. participation in climate change mitigation 
efforts is the potential impact on the international competitiveness of 
U.S. industries.210  Another concern is “carbon leakage.”  Carbon leakage 
occurs when carbon-intensive industries move from countries with carbon 
restrictions to countries with less stringent carbon policies.  Carbon 
leakage threatens not only competitiveness and domestic jobs, but the 
environmental effectiveness of the carbon mitigation scheme.211  In the 
U.S., carbon-intensive manufacturing industries such as iron and steel, 
aluminum and copper, nonmetal mineral products, paper and pulp, and 
basic chemicals, are already facing pressure from international competition, 
particularly large emerging economies without carbon emissions 
commitments such as China, India, and Brazil.212  These industries produce 
more than half of all CO2 emissions from the manufacturing sector.213  
 206. Id. at 28–31. 
 207. See  J. COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE TRADE DISPUTE 
RELATING TO THE PRIOR-LAW FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION PROVISIONS AND THE PRESENT- 
LAW EXCLUSIONS FOR EXTRA TERRITORIAL INCOME AND A DESCRIPTION OF THESE RULES 
(July 26, 2002). 
 208. Id. at 2–5. 
 209. Alan Beattie & Sheila McNulty, Green Barricade Trade Faces a New Test as 
Carbon Taxes Go Global, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at 7 (stating Brazil has filed a formal 
complaint with WTO challenging the tariff). Brazil seeks to have ethanol classified as an 
“environmental good” in the Doha Development Round, which would result in tariff 
cuts. Id. See also Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, Moonshine to Motorfuel: Tax 
Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L.  POL’Y F. 43, 54 (2008). 
 210. Trevor Houser, Rob Bradley, Britt Childs, Jacob Werksman, & Robert Heilmayr, 
Leveling the Carbon Playing Field: International Competition and U.S. Climate Policy 
Design, xv PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS & WRI (May 2008) 
(leveling_the_carbon_playing_field.pdf). 
 211. Tamiotti et al., supra note 61, at 99. 
 212. Houser et al., supra note 212, at xv–xvi. 
 213. Houser et al., supra note 212, at xvi. 
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Measures to avoid competitive disadvantage and reduce carbon leakage 
will be a key part of any politically successful climate legislation. 
To protect the competitiveness of U.S. products within the U.S., the 
measure might attempt to impose the same costs on imported goods as 
U.S. climate legislation imposes on domestic production.  To protect the 
global competitiveness of U.S. businesses, the measure might exclude 
goods exported from the U.S. from the domestic carbon pricing scheme.  
There are a number of methods to meet these goals, but some of those 
methods may be more likely to face challenge under WTO trade rules.214  
WTO trade rules require trade measures to comply with nondiscrimination 
standards, and usually require showing that the measure is designed to 
achieve a legitimate policy objective in the least trade restrictive way.215  
WTO trade rules do not consider protection of domestic producers from 
foreign competition a legitimate policy objective.216 
A border tax adjustment (BTA) has the best chance of preserving 
competitiveness while avoiding WTO challenge.  The BTA could be 
explained as “simply the import-equivalent of domestic U.S. climate 
policy.”217  The BTA should be carefully crafted to avoid discrimination 
against imports, both as against U.S. products and between products 
imported from different countries.218  Of course, this is more easily said 
than done.  The GHG emissions from the production of similar or identical 
products may vary depending on the individual producer as well as the 
country of production.219  A WTO-compliant BTA may be fairly simple 
to craft if the U.S. adopts a carbon tax, but faces additional complexity if 
the U.S. adopts a cap-and-trade system.  In a cap-and-trade system with 
fluctuating market prices, it is difficult to determine whether the BTA 
accurately reflects the burden that the imported product would have 
imposed had it been made domestically.220  The issue becomes even 
 214. Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The 
Limits and Options of International Trade Law (April 2007) available at www.nicholas. 
duke.edu/institute/internationaltradelaw.pdf. “As the United States is internationally bound by 
WTO law, any competitiveness provision that violates WTO agreements risks a challenge by 
the US’ trading partners before the WTO dispute settlement body.” Id. 
 215. Houser et al., supra note 212, at 31. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Pauwelyn, supra note 216, at 16. 
 218. Tamiotti et al, supra note 61, at 101. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Tamiotti et al, supra note 61, at 101 (“The main challenges [to implementing a 
border tax adjustment are] (i) the difficulty in assessing product specific emissions, and 
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more complex if the allowances are not auctioned but rather distributed 
for free.221 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
Coordinating a cap-and-trade scheme with the existing Federal income 
tax system, while perhaps not as challenging as nuclear physics or string 
theory, is a task of daunting complexity.  Assuming, as I have been, that 
the U.S. enacts cap-and-trade legislation in essentially similar form to 
the pending legislative proposals, the first step is to determine the tax 
consequences of receiving the allowances.  If all the allowances were 
auctioned, the answer would be simple: the receipt would not be taxable 
and the allowance would have a tax basis that equals the purchase price.  
For a free allowance, the value of the allowance could either be taxable 
on receipt (in whole or in part), taxable when used, or not taxable at all.  
Commentators have persuasively argued that the allowances should be 
taxable when received.  Taxing the allowances when received would 
provide rough parity between those businesses who use the allowances 
and those who sell them. 
Next, what tax consequences flow from the use or sale of the allowances?  
The use of the allowances will likely produce a current deduction for 
tax purposes.  The gain or loss recognized on the allowances could either 
be characterized as capital or ordinary.  Current tax rules would likely 
characterize allowances as ordinary assets in the hands of covered firms 
but as capital assets in the hands of investors.  Covered firms could benefit 
from significant deferral of tax consequences by banking and borrowing 
allowances.  Treating the allowances as ordinary assets in the hands of 
all holders would simplify the tax treatment and may reduce speculation, 
but would create inconsistent tax treatment vis-a-vis other investment 
assets.  This inconsistency could reduce the liquidity and transparency of 
the carbon market. 
The taxation of carbon derivatives is a perplexing problem, although 
perhaps not more so than the taxation of any derivative financial product.  
Particularly in the early years of carbon trading, uncertainty about the 
tax consequences may cause burdens on investors and the IRS alike.  On 
 221. Pauwelyn, supra note 216, at 21–22. See also Houser et al., supra note 212, at 
34 (noting that “given the number of variables in terms of production methods, capital 
stock, and energy sources, it is nearly impossible to accurately assess embedded emissions of 
goods at the border on a case-by-case basis”). 
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the other hand, the IRS has developed rules for taxing SOx and NOx 
allowance trades, which could provide guidance. 
Implementing a cap-and-trade system has significant international 
trade implications that could best be addressed by a border tax adjustment 
(BTA).  A WTO-compliant BTA is easier to craft if the domestic carbon 
mitigation scheme is a carbon tax rather than cap-and-trade.  A cap-and-
trade scheme results in fluctuating carbon prices, making it difficult to 
impose a BTA that is similar to the cost impact of the domestic cap-and-
trade.  Free distribution of allowances further complicates the calculation. 
Finally, imposing a cost on carbon, whether via a cap-and-trade scheme 
or a carbon tax will change the effectiveness of tax incentives for low-
carbon energy.  Each tax incentive should be carefully examined to assess 
whether it is still needed.  Renewable energy tax incentives might still be 
justified because of barriers to capital investment and slow consumer 
response. 
Similarly, either a cap-and-trade scheme or a carbon tax would impose 
disproportionate costs on lower income households.  In fairness, the burden 
of saving the planet should not fall on the poor.  The tax system can smooth 
the impact.  Auctioning carbon allowances would provide the necessary 
revenue.  In sum, a cap-and-trade system represents a more complicated 
alternative to restricting carbon emissions.  Policymakers should not forget 
the tax system when implementing cap-and-trade.  Thoughtful attention 
to tax consequences of cap-and-trade design could produce a smoother 
transition to a cooler world. 
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